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1 One reviewer asks that I ‘‘define cancer’’ in a senten
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control cell birth and death; these include not only mu
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(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.0Cancer is not one, but many diseases, and each is a product of a variety of causes acting (and interacting)
at distinct temporal and spatial scales, or ‘‘levels’’ in the biological hierarchy. In part because of this diver-
sity of cancer types and causes, there has been a diversity of models, hypotheses, and explanations of car-
cinogenesis. However, there is one model of carcinogenesis that seems to have survived the
diversification of cancer types: the multi-stage model of carcinogenesis. This paper examines the history
of the multistage theory, and uses the theory as a case study in the limits and goals of unification as a
theoretical virtue, comparing and contrasting it with ‘‘integrative’’ research.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1. Introduction
In this paper, we will consider one central project in the history
of cancer1 research, modeling carcinogenesis as a multi-stage pro-
cess, as a case study for investigating the ideals of ‘‘unification’’ ver-
sus ‘‘integration’’ in the sciences. Multistage models of cancer
represent cancer initiation and progression to neoplastic state as a
multi-stage process, driven by the acquisition of a series of muta-
tions. Sometimes this view is assimilated with an ‘‘evolutionary’’
perspective on cancer, since a cancer’s capacity to attract a blood
supply, invade neighboring tissue, and metastasize, are all seen as
the result of the acquisition of a series of mutations that increase
the relative ‘‘fitness’’ of the cancer cells (Merlo, Pepper, Reid, & Maley
2006; Nowell, 1976). Whether or no cancer progression is best
viewed as an evolutionary process is a question requiring further
exploration (Plutynski, in press); so, we focus here on the multistage
theory.
Cancer incidence increases as a power of age; the multistage
theory explains this phenomenon as due to the rate-limited accu-
mulation of mutations to genes (as well as chromosomal and epi-ll rights reserved.
ce or two. In my view, this is very di
/cancerlibrary/what-is-cancer). Sec
ry and sufficient conditions or esse
tations, but also chromosomal chan
ts would require a very different pa
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3.019genetic changes) that play key roles in the regulation of the cell
cycle. The theory also explains departures from average age of inci-
dence curves. For instance, familial forms of cancer cause a shift
the age of incidence curves, due to hereditary mutations that
‘‘accelerate’’ the onset of cancer (Knudson, 1971). The multistage
theory appears to explain some patterns of cancer incidence quite
well. Most notably, for colon cancer, not only have the specific ser-
ies of mutations leading to a specific cancer type have been identi-
fied, but their mechanisms of action, and thus role in causing
dysplastic growth, are well understood (Fearon & Vogelstein,
1990). The history of the multistage theory is a useful illustration
of both the advantages and limits of mathematical modeling in
arriving at general theories in biomedicine.
Carcinogenesis is a complex process, due to many causes acting
both at the level of the cell and above (Bissell & Short, 2009). How,
if at all, may a simple mathematical model capture all the various
causes of cancer(s), acting at distinct temporal and spatial scales?
It cannot, and it should not. Abstract models, such as the family
of models of carcinogenesis, are intended to identify the central
causal factors yielding some outcome, at one well-defined levelfficult to do, first, because cancer is many different diseases (see, e.g., NCI’s website on
ond, like many biological kinds, cancer is, at best, a HPC kind (Williams, 2011); there
ntial properties. At minimum, cancer is a breakdown in features of the organism that
ges, epigenetic factors, tissue disorganization, and much else besides. Addressing the
per. I address this and related issues in a forthcoming book.
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enous to the system of interest. Such causes are treated as more or
less a black box. At least initially, there was no representation in
the multi-stage models of the role of the tumor microenvironment,
immune system, diet, or smoking. Nonetheless, the models were a
way of systematically representing carcinogenesis, consistent with
a variety of independent evidence: patterns of cancer incidence by
age, patterns of cancer incidence in childhood cancers, and toxico-
logical data on the effects of chemical carcinogens on animals.
More recently, such models have been integrated with data from
molecular genetics on the role of specific genes in cell birth and
death, and data on the rate and structure of cell renewal in differ-
ent tissue types (Frank, 2007; Frank & Nowak, 2004). That is, what
began as a way of modeling cancer at one level of analysis using
simple mathematical models became a theoretical framework for
integrating new data from different levels of analysis—both from
the ‘‘bottom up’’ and ‘‘top down’’.
Biologist Steven Frank (2007) calls the family of models that
represent cancer as a multi-stage process the ‘‘dynamics’’ of cancer.
This characterization suggests an analogy with Newtonian dynam-
ics, the theory that unified terrestrial and celestial mechanics.
Mathematical representations of cancer initiation and progression
as a dynamic, multi-stage process are analogous to Newtonian
mechanics in the following respects. They both treat complex phe-
nomena using simple mathematical models, and both hypothe-
sized that there were common causes, driving observed patterns.
Moreover, both treat different phenomena—in the case of multi-
stage theory, distinct cancers—as of a kind. Hereditary and somatic
cancers, cancers found in different tissues or of different types are
all, on this theory, subject to similar causes acting in similar ways.
This unifying perspective had the virtue that it served as a guiding
idea for a research program. Seeing distinct cancers as subject to
similar causes was central to a research program that (in part)
led to the discovery of a family of genes that play important roles
in all cancers: TP53, RB, APC, HRAS. It also led to the realization that
understanding genes and their activity in isolation from the tumor
microenvironment was not sufficient to explain carcinogenesis.
Thus, the history of multistage theory can serve as an interesting
case study for the purported virtues of ‘‘integrative’’ or ‘‘unified’’
theories and explanations in the sciences.
As many philosophers writing on the explanatory power of uni-
fying theories have noted (see Cartwright, 1980) unification often
comes at a cost; unified theories or laws with wide scope trade
generality and cohesiveness for simplification or omission of com-
plex causal details. And, if anything is an instance of a complex
causal processes, carcinogenesis is it. No single model could possi-
bly incorporate all the factors affecting carcinogenesis; in part, be-
cause cancers are so different, but in part, also, because cancer is
not simply a ‘‘genetic’’ disease. Mutations are a significant differ-
ence maker in cancer, but they are not the only one (Bissell &
Hines, 2011). The multistage theory focuses causal factors that
shift the age of incidence curve: core difference makers to the time
of onset of cancer. This accumulation of mutations is taken to ex-
plain the fact that cancer incidence by and large increases as a
power of age.
By focusing on mutations, the multistage theory trades simplic-
ity and unifying power for explanatory detail. However, over time,
the theory has come to incorporate evidence from a wider domain.2 The NSF, the National Academy of Sciences, the MacArthur Foundation, the Mellon F
interdisciplinary, ‘‘integrative’’ research (Brint, Turk-Bicakci, Proctor, & Murphy, 2009; Kess
the NCI founded the ‘‘Integrative Cancer Biology Program: Centers for Cancer Systems Bio
biological system,’’ including Columbia, MIT, Georgetown, Memorial Sloan-Kettering, an
dynamics and genomics. In 2009, 2010, and 2011, the NIH issued a series of funding oppor
associated with the Integrative Cancer Biology Program (ICBP) or Tumor Microenvironment
they propose to collaborate’’ (http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/par-09-026.html)
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integration as a process. While in some sense, it started as a
‘‘reductive’’ and ‘‘unifying’’ theory, reducing carcinogenesis to
nothing more than the serial acquisition of genetic mutations, over
time, it has incorporated more data, from a variety of methodolog-
ical and theoretical perspectives. Though, even in the beginning,
the theory required moving between levels of analysis; that is, it
required the insight that epidemiological data on age of incidence
might provide some clue as to the etiology of cancer.
1.1. Cancer and the call for integration
While the sheer number and diversity of questions and subject
matter in cancer research would seem to argue for greater special-
ization, recently, there has been a call from both granting agencies
and major research universities for more ‘‘integrative’’ and ‘‘inter-’’
or ‘‘trans-disciplinary’’ research.2 As an example, in 2003, the US
National Cancer Institute’s (NCI) Division of Cancer Biology ‘‘initiated
a program to highlight (1) systems biology, (2) a systems approach
to cancer biology, (3) interdisciplinary and collaborative research
and (4) interdisciplinary training.’’ With an initial $14.9 million in
funding, the Integrative Cancer Biology Program (ICBP) was created,
and in 2004, nine interdisciplinary centers were founded, ‘‘incorpo-
rating a spectrum of new technologies such as genomics, proteomics,
and molecular imaging, to generate computer and mathematical
models that could predict the cancer process.’’ (NCI, 2012, http://
icbp.nci.nih.gov/). ‘‘Integrative’’ research, in part as a result of fund-
ing initiatives such as the above, has been promoted in many other
areas in biomedical science: many institutions have founded re-
search programs, institutes, and centers of ‘‘integrative’’ research.
A search in PubMed with the terms ‘‘cancer’’ and ‘‘integration’’ turns
up over 9000 hits.
What exactly is being called for with these demands for integra-
tive research? And why should we presume that integration would
be a good thing? Perhaps because so many kinds of things may be
‘‘integrated’’ (data, methods, explanations; see O’Malley, this is-
sue), there are many different meanings at play; and, all too often
the term is used rhetorically as an advertisement of forward-think-
ing science with very little warrant. So, what does warrant the
appellation? This paper will provide an overview of different philo-
sophical accounts of both what integration might be (Section 2); a
case study of the multistage theory (Section 3); and, finally an
argument for the following: (a) the success of explanatory ‘‘inte-
gration’’ is always relative to some specific scientific problem (cf.
Brigandt, 2010, 2013; also, Love, 2008), and so one should be wary
of generalizations about ‘‘the’’ goals of explanatory integration, and
(b) theoretical frameworks may become successively more ‘‘inte-
grative’’ over time, along a variety of dimensions (Section 4). While
these points may be not entirely novel (see, e.g., Bechtel, 2010; Bri-
gandt, 2013; Love, 2010), the below will hopefully provide some
framework for future discussion of both the goals of integration
in future philosophical work, particularly in the context of biomed-
ical research.
2. What is integration? How is it distinct from unification?
A variety of philosophers of science have offered models
of ‘‘integrative’’ research, and ‘‘integrative explanation’’ inoundation, and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, have all issued calls for more
el et al., 2008; National Academy of Sciences, 2005). Most relevant to cancer, however,
logy,’’ which set up several institutions as centers for study of cancer as a ‘‘complex
d UT Austin. Most of these institutions focus on computational modeling of cancer
tunity announcements supporting ‘‘new collaborative projects between investigators
Network (TMEN) and researchers who are not involved with the program with which
.
tion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
A. Plutynski / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 3overlapping problem domains, as well as ‘‘interfield’’ theories, as
one alternative to the view that unification in the sciences is
achieved viz. theory reduction in Nagel’s (1961) sense (cf. Bechtel,
1986, 1993, 2010; Brigandt, 2010; Brigandt & Love, 2012; Craver,
2005, 2007; Darden, 2005; Darden & Maull, 1977; Love, 2008,
2010; Maull, 1977; Mitchell, 2003; Mitchell & Dietrich, 2006;
O’Malley & Soyer, 2011). What exactly is being ‘‘integrated,’’
how, and why is this (presumed to be) a good thing? Further,
how is integrative research distinct from ‘‘unification’’ as a goal
in the sciences? In this section, I will first introduce an analytic
framework for discussing integration (explicating, in turn, research
traditions, problem domains, disciplines, standards, methods, and
objects of explanation as these terms are used in the literature in
integration), provide a brief overview of a few of the distinctive
features of integrative research that the above authors have iden-
tified, review some of the motivations for integration, and then
turn to distinctions between integration and unification.
First, a research tradition, following Laudan (1977) is ‘‘a set of
general assumptions about the entities and processes in a domain
of study, and about the appropriate methods to be used for inves-
tigating the problems and constructing theories in that domain’’ (p.
81). Such a research tradition is successful when it leads to ‘‘solu-
tions’’ to ‘‘an increasing range of empirical and conceptual prob-
lems.’’ Success is not necessarily due to the truth of its
component theories or accuracy in its ontology, however; Laudan
argues that a research tradition can be ‘‘fruitful in generating the-
ories’’ yet ‘‘flawed in its ontology or methodology’’ (cf. p. 82). More-
over, research traditions have a historical dimension, and can
change over time; so, it is mistaken to view them as ‘‘true’’ or
‘‘false,’’ in the way that hypotheses may be. Finally, and more to
our purposes here, Laudan speaks of research traditions being or
becoming ‘‘integrated,’’ and such amalgamation of traditions may
‘‘suggest important new lines of research, and put scientists in a
position to deal with empirical and conceptual problems which
neither of the ancestor traditions alone could resolve satisfactorily’’
(p. 104). Laudan gives several examples of research traditions in
the physical sciences, (Aristotelian, Galilean, Cartesian, Newto-
nian), and describes changes in them over time. As historians of
science have pointed out (McMullin, 1979), such traditions are
not discrete—they both merge and change over time (even embrac-
ing contradictory assumptions, a point the Laudan grants), so it be-
comes difficult to demarcate them, or say when one has been
replaced by another.
Contemporary philosophers of science working on integration,
perhaps sensitive to this concern, have adopted variants on Lau-
dan’s views. For instance, one of the first models of ‘‘integration,’’
Darden and Maull’s notion of an ‘‘interfield theory,’’ treated the
units of integration as ‘‘two previously unrelated fields,’’ where
fields are defined by a set of common questions, techniques, and
methods. In one of Darden and Maull’s examples, the fields in
question were Mendelian genetics and cytology, which were inte-
grated via the chromosomal theory of inheritance. Today, it is com-
mon to find philosophers of science speaking of ‘‘problem
domains’’ or ‘‘problem agendas’’ as loci of integration (Brigandt,
2010, 2013; Love, 2008), where what defines these domains is a
set of questions, and related criteria of explanatory adequacy. For
instance, one of Love’s central examples is the inquiry into the ori-
gin of evolutionary novelties. Explaining the origin of novel mor-
phological structures in a species, qualitatively different from
ancestral traits, is a problem agenda that may be broken down into
a variety of questions, and answering such questions requires
drawing upon a variety of concepts and methods from several
disciplines.
Drawing upon this analytic framework, then, the features of
integration that a variety of authors mentioned above have identi-
fied are the following:Please cite this article in press as: Plutynski, A. Cancer and the goals of integra
(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.03.019- Integration involves some form of collaboration between fields
or research programs, ranging from drawing upon evidence
from different fields (a minimum requirement), to sharing lab-
oratory techniques, methods, or concepts, on up to placing con-
straints on explanation from one field to another.
- Researchers studying the same subject or question, but from
different traditions or with different methodologies, might be
called upon to collaborate or to make connections between
their different approaches.
- Integration frequently occurs at historical periods when scien-
tists seek to address new questions or problems that require
information or tools that might fall outside of their discipline,
or even any existing discipline (see, e.g., Bechtel, 1986, 1993,
Brigandt, 2010; Darden & Maull, 1977; Love, 2010).
- Integration may occur both ‘‘within’’ and ‘‘across’’ ‘‘levels’’ of
analysis, or distinct spatial, or temporal scales (Craver, 2005,
2007; see also, Mitchell & Dietrich, 2006).
- Integrative explanations are frequently local; that is, they often
involve establishment of epistemic and ontological connections
between two specific areas of research, (e.g., cancer epidemiol-
ogy and molecular genetics of cancer), rather than, e.g., two
entire disciplines (e.g., physics and chemistry).
- Integration is often contrasted with ‘‘unification,’’ in that it is
not concerned to provide a single theoretical framework for a
whole field or discipline, but rather solve a specific problem,
or address a particular question (see, e.g., Mitchell, 2003).
- The nature of integration is such that it may involve ‘‘transient’’
connections between otherwise independent domains of
research, targeted at addressing specific questions or problems
(Brigandt, 2010).
- A few philosophers working on integration take the search for
‘‘mechanism’’ as a central factor driving integrative work (see,
e.g., Bechtel, 1986, 1993, 2010, this issue; Craver, 2007; Darden,
2005).
- Those emphasizing a search for mechanism often associate
integration with the placing of ‘‘constraints’’ on explanations
at one scale of analysis by another. Such constraints may be
‘‘top-down’’—e.g., a description of system in which a mecha-
nism resides will determine what component parts or mecha-
nisms will be relevant in some explanation—or, ‘‘bottom up’’
in the sense that discoveries about lower-level phenomena
may constrain the ‘‘higher level’’ explanatory possibilities as
well (see, e.g., Bechtel, 2010; Craver, 2007).
- All advocates of integration see it as an alternative to the pro-
gram of theory reduction via deductive subsumption, as
described by Nagel (1961), though some defend ‘‘explanatory’’
and ‘‘mechanistic’’ reduction as not only consistent with but
an important component of integration (see, e.g., Bechtel &
Hamilton 2007).
- Work on integration has tended to emphasize the institutional
and social factors involved inmaking connections betweendisci-
plines. Thus, e.g., Darden andMaull’s account of ‘‘interfield’’ the-
ories emphasized expectations, techniques and methods over
‘‘concepts, laws or theories,’’ (Darden &Maull, 1977) and Bechtel
(1993) emphasizes the role of laboratory cultures, and how the
institutional features of science function either to promote or fail
to promote integrative work (see also Gerson, this issue).
It seems that what all those defining integration share is the no-
tion thatwhatmatters is not only that researchers share data, meth-
ods, concepts, laboratories, tools etc., but how this process of
collaboration shapes their research. At minimum, the collaborative
activitymust lead either to (a) a transformation in researchers’ con-
ception of the object of explanation, or (b) a change in what would
count as an adequate explanation of that object, or (c) both. One
way of cashing this out is in terms of placing ‘‘constraints’’ ontion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
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research tradition by another. For instance, those who share a com-
mitment to the view that discovery of mechanisms is central to sci-
entific explanation will (not surprisingly) see explanatory
integration as facilitated by the discovery ofmechanisms, or, as Cra-
ver argues in the context of neuroscience, ‘‘constraints onmechanis-
tic organization . . .act as loci for interfield integration’’ (Craver,
2007). For instance, informationaboutdifferent levels or component
parts of a mechanismmay constrain explanations at other levels.
Why is integration a good thing? Is it always to be sought? How
is it distinct from the virtue of ‘‘unification’’? Are the two goals nec-
essarily at odds? The current thinking seems to be that the virtue
of integration is distinct from that of ‘‘unification’’ in that it is prob-
lem-oriented. Bechtel (1986, 2006) argues that integration (e.g., of
disciplines, methods, or laboratory cultures) is primarily in service
of solving a specific problem. Different disciplines (e.g., chemistry,
genetics) or perhaps subdisciplines (akin to ‘‘fields,’’ e.g., molecular
genetics of cancer), will deploy their different tools and conceptual
frameworks together to resolve a problem that may not be resolv-
able by any discipline in isolation. Thus, integration is a virtue of a
kind of ‘‘meta-methodology,’’ in service of solving a specific kind of
problem (see O’Malley, this issue). Integrationists may be pluralists
about explanation; the world (and our scientific explanations of it)
may never be wholly integrated; there may be very different (and
perhaps equally serviceable) ways of breaking up world that may
(in the end) be incompatible.3 Nonetheless, integration may be both
possible and desirable for specific problems domains where there is
meaningful overlap between the entities and properties of concern
to different domains or subdisciplines. Integrative work, on this pic-
ture, might not lead to greater unity of the sciences as a whole, and
may be compatible with a modest pluralism (see, e.g., Kellert et al.,
2006; Mitchell, 2003).
In contrast, ‘‘unification’’ is usually understood to be a regula-
tive ideal for ‘‘theories’’ or ‘‘explanations’’ (Grantham, 2004; Kit-
cher, 1999). More ‘‘unified’’ theories are taken to be more
comprehensive, or ‘‘cover’’ a wider scope of phenomena. A more
unified or unifying theory is a theory that thus permits inferences
about and explanations of diverse kinds of phenomena, drawing
upon common causes, processes, or ‘‘explanatory schema’’ (Kit-
cher, 1981). According to Strevens (2008), the unificationist ac-
count of explanation is an instance of the ‘‘pattern-subsumption’’
account; where, a phenomenon is explained via subsumption un-
der a general model, explanation schema, or law. Such an account
is not necessarily at odds with a causal account of explanation. For
instance, Strevens (2004, 2008) argues for a ‘‘karietic’’ account of
explanation, according to which a theory that ‘‘unifies’’ is to be pre-
ferred when and if it picks out the ‘‘shared difference-making’’ fac-
tors, or the most salient causes of distinct phenomena.
‘‘Unification’’ is standardly attributed to theories, models, or expla-
nations, whereas integration is usually attributed to a problem-
solving activity or research program that requires sharing data,
methods or theoretical resources.
However, integration and unification do have some features in
common. For instance, both often result in a transformation in
the object of explanation. In the case of integration, distinct fields
may shed new light on a problem or object of study. In the case of
unification, objects of explanation previously seen as distinct or
unrelated may be understood to be of a kind, subject to similar
causes, or common explanatory schemes. Second, integration and
unification both involve transformation of what would count as
an adequate explanation of said object; both unifying theories
and integration reconfigure explanations across distinct domains,
though through different means. Third, while unification is usually3 Some see this as an open empirical question, others take it as a matter of fact; for a d
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cess, sometimes taking decades of exchange between neighboring
disciplines, we will argue that a unified theory or model may be the
first step in a more integrative research program.
The two goals may seem to pull in different directions, as unifi-
cation is often associated with reduction. On one classical view of
unifying theories (Friedman, 1974), we unify when we ‘‘reduce’’
the number of phenomena we must take as ‘‘brute’’. However, in
our view, sometimes a unified theory may become the framework
for a more integrative research program, as we will argue in the
case of the multi-stage model of cancer. There are of course many
other dimensions along which one might view scientific activity as
more or less ‘‘integrative’’ (e.g., conceptual integration, institu-
tional integration, etc.), but for the purposes of the case study to
follow, we will follow O’Malley and Soyer’s (2011) focus on
data integration, methodological integration, and explanatory
integration.
Let us take a minimal condition on data integration to be shar-
ing evidence. More stringent conditions on data integration would
involve synthesizing or making comparable data types from very
different sources, or discerning patterns among data (Leonelli, this
issue). As O’Malley and Soyer (2011) describe this process in con-
temporary molecular biology, this often involves ‘‘theorizing and
modelling databases, quantifying data accurately, developing stan-
dardization procedures, cleaning data, and providing efficient and
user-friendly interfaces to enable data not only to be reused, but
reanalyzed and combined in novel ways’’ (p. 61). Examples of this
kind of data integration are to be found today in climate modeling,
bioinformatics, and molecular genetics and genomics, where a vast
influx of data needs to be compared or shared. The creation of
shared databases, with standardized ontologies, is no simple task,
but one which often transforms or reconfigures the object of expla-
nation in a way that can yield novel hypotheses or explanations
(O’Malley and Soyer, 2011).
A second dimension along which integration can occur is by
sharing or integrating methods or tools of analysis. There are both
specific methods or tools for addressing specific questions or prob-
lems (e.g., Luria-Delbruck fluctuation test, the McDonald-Kreitman
test), and very general methodologies (e.g., the iterated process of
mathematical modeling of a dynamic). A minimum condition on
methodological integration is that the tools are imported or ex-
ported from one subdiscipline or domain to another; a more strin-
gent condition is that the process of sharing and developing such
tools informs both what and how the object of investigation is con-
ceived (e.g., as a dynamic process), and what might constitute ade-
quate explanations of the object. One way in which this has been
done in the past is when mathematical representations are im-
ported from one into another context; this happened with Max-
well’s adoption of a dynamical theory for the behavior of
molecules in a gas, suggesting the use of a set of equations for rep-
resenting their behavior that he might not have otherwise
(Achinstein, 1987). The development of formal or theoretical mod-
els can be one way of delimiting the ‘‘possible’’ and the actual (see,
e.g., Lewontin, 2000), given some set of assumptions about the sys-
tem of interest. Such development is iterated, or often involves
multiple rounds of integrating new evidence, rethinking or qualify-
ing assumptions of the model(s), thus reconceptualizing both the
object and the best modeling strategy for that object. Greater
methodological integration also might involve the use or synthesis
of multiple modalities for modeling the same system, process, or
entity. For instance, a simple dynamical model that represents
change over time could be used as a first step toward a three
dimensional simulation, one which gives a more comprehensiveiscussion, see, e.g., Kellert, Longino, & Waters (2006).
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Pienty, & Forrest, 2006, for a multistage three-dimensional agent-
based model of cancer progression).
Explanatory integration involves answering a novel question, in
a way that draws upon multiple different sources of evidence from
different fields. This could come about by showing how a pattern
investigated in one field is a product of a process or mechanism
investigated by a different field, or, simply establishing the consis-
tency and/or complementarity of theory, models, hypotheses, or
data of different types. For instance, Fisher (1918) demonstrated
the consistency of continuous characters with a particulate theory
of inheritance, thus resolving a perceived conflict between Darwin-
ism and Mendelism (Plutynski, 2004). That is, explanatory integra-
tion does not require identification of a mechanism, though
mechanisms can be useful tools for fostering integration. A math-
ematical model, computer simulation, or other forms of represen-
tation can synthesize data in a new way, showing how patterns or
processes at one level are linked to or consistent with patterns or
processes at another. This kind of synthesis is explanatory, even
if the explanation captures one part or aspect of a dynamics of
some system (see also Brigandt, this issue). Successive iterations
of models might lead to the transformation, or reshaping, of one
model or conceptualization of the system of interest by another.
An example is the gradual transformation of the Lotke equations
of population growth from a simple logistical representation of
rate limited change to contemporary versions with multiple spe-
cies, non-overlapping generations, etc. (see, e.g. Kingsland, 1995
for a history). This gradual transformation involved explanatory
reframing of the forces governing change in populations via incor-
poration of better data, better modeling strategies, and, over time,
a better conceptualization of the object of explanation. This is an
example of greater integration leading away from simplicity to-
ward greater complexity (Mitchell, 2003).
There are many examples of each of each of the above kinds of
integrative work in cancer biology today—from the construction of
databases in cancer genomics, to the development of ‘‘systems’’
epidemiology, the representation of a suite of interacting causes
of cancer from the molecular to behavioral (Hoos et al., 2011; Spitz
& Bondy, 2010). These projects are integrative in a variety of differ-
ent senses: they may integrate data, methods, or explanations
drawing upon fields of research that have previously been inde-
pendent. However, the focus of this paper, and the following sec-
tion, will be a single case study, the multistage model of cancer’s
dynamics. How, if at all, is this family of models ‘‘integrative’’?
3. Case study: multi-stage model of carcinogenesis
Starting in the 1940s, biologists began to develop a family of
models that represent cancer initiation and progression mathe-
matically as a product of a series of rate-limited steps. The first
quantitative mathematical models to represent cancer as the prod-
uct of multistage progression were developed by two biologists
who found that mice acquired skin tumors after repeated applica-
tion of benzopyrene (Charles & Luce-Clausen, 1942). Charles and
Luce-Clawson hypothesized that cancer was the product of a
‘‘series of mutations,’’ to a single gene that led to the development
of dysplasia or atypical growth of cells. Over the next several dec-
ades, Armitage and Doll (1954), and Knudson (1971) elaborated
upon these mathematical/biological models of cancer as a multi-
stage process. Some of these focused on single genes, some on mul-
tiple genes; some traced age-specific incidence to two ‘‘hits,’’ oth-
ers traced it to five or six ‘‘hits.’’ All drew upon a variety of different
sources of data about cancer: epidemiological data showing pat-
terns of cancer incidence by age, data on age of inheritance in
childhood cancer, toxicological data on the effects of chemical car-
cinogens on animals, and most recently, data from molecularPlease cite this article in press as: Plutynski, A. Cancer and the goals of integra
(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.03.019genetics (Balmain, 2001), as well as data on the rate and structure
of cell renewal in different tissue types (Frank, 2007).
As with all mathematical models in biology, the multistage
models of cancer progression are only a partial representations of
the complex process of carcinogenesis, though one that has been
enormously fruitful in both framing hypotheses and integrating
data from different research programs. One of the major domains
of growth in what gets called ‘‘integrative’’ cancer research (or at
least one of the major sources of funding by programs like ICBP)
is mathematical and computational models to represent the com-
plex causes yielding cancer (Galea, Riddle, & Kaplan, 2010). These
models have become enormously sophisticated, representing com-
plex networks of causes and whole systems of interaction and
feedback both within and across scales (see, e.g., Spitz & Bondy,
2010). The multistage theory was one of the first attempts to gen-
erate a unified mathematical model of cancer initiation and pro-
gression to neoplastic state. While the early models were simple,
idealized representations, they have become more complex, inte-
grating a wider array of data, over time. In this section, we will ap-
ply two of the three dimensions mentioned above to the case of
models of cancer dynamics. There are two ways in which modeling
carcinogenesis is currently becoming more ‘‘integrative’’:
- First, cancer dynamics integrates data from different subdisci-
plines: cell andmolecular biology, developmental biology, epide-
miology, and medicine (particularly research into patterns of
incidence familial or ‘‘hereditary’’ cancer), and molecular
genetics.
- Second, cancer dynamics constitutes an explanatory integration
of patterns of cancer incidence and dynamics of cancer initia-
tion and progression.
First, it is important to be clear about the object of explanation
of the multistage theory. The multistage theory aims to explain
patterns of cancer incidence in populations. Frank characterizes the
project of his book as follows: ‘‘To understand cancer means to
understand the genetic and environmental factors that determine
the incidence curve. To learn about cancer, we study how genetic
and environmental changes shift the incidence curve toward ear-
lier or later stages’’ (Frank, 2007, p. 1). To be sure, this is not all
it means to ‘‘understand cancer’’; there are many different objects
of explanation in cancer research, and explanatory success de-
pends upon one’s object. Carcinogenesis itself is a complex process
that involves causal factors outside the cell; Soto and Sonnenschein
characterize carcinogenesis as: ‘‘the complex process whereby a
mutation ends up forming the tissue dislocation typical of the carcin-
ogenic lesion.’’ (Ibid., 1999, p. xi). In other words, howwe character-
ize the object of explanation changes the relevant explanatory
story. Soto and Sonnenschein (1999) argue at some length that
cancer researchers ought to be concerned with a different question
altogether than has been the focus in carcinogenesis: instead of
focusing on specific mutations and their role in cancer, focus
should turn to the role of the tissue microenvironment in cancer
initiation and progression. Indeed, this is an active field of research,
which has yielded important insights into cancer progression (see,
e.g., Xu et al., 2009). However, in evaluating the explanatory suc-
cess of a theory, one needs to be carefully attentive to the goal(s)
of explanation and historical context.
3.1. Data integration
The multistage theory began by integrating data: collecting
information about cancer incidence and generating a set of charac-
teristic age-specific incidence curves for different cancers. As early
as the 1920s, descriptive epidemiologists began to determine that
different cancer types have characteristic curves of age-specifiction. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
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with age, peaking at about 65, and then much more gradually ris-
ing and eventually leveling off, through old age. On average, most
women who get breast cancer do so between 50 and 75.4
What the authors of the multistage theory argued was most
striking about these age-specific incidence curves was not differ-
ences (e.g., between different cancers), but similarities. Whether
a cancer is common or rare, age-specific incidence curves have a
similar shape; cancer incidence increases by and large as a power
of age. That is, when one compares age of incidence across different
cancers, one may see these curves as a pattern, such that it be-
comes possible to conceive a common (general) explanation. The
fact that cancer incidence by and large increases as a power of
age suggests a stepwise, cumulative process underpinning this out-
come. One of the core insights driving the development of the mul-
tistage theory is that we can learn about processes of carcinogenesis
by studying patterns of cancer incidence at the population level.
While it seems simple, the generation of log–log plots of age-spe-
cific cancer incidence was one of the most important steps in get-
ting researchers to conceive of different cancers as a product of a
similar process. The data integration of these patterns constrained
the development of models of cancer’s dynamics.
Patterns of age-specific incidence were only one of several
sources of data that are brought to bear in developing mathemat-
ical models of cancer dynamics. Over the past several decades, new
data has been brought to bear on construction and refinement of
the models, from a variety of sources: cell biology, molecular
genetics, toxicology, developmental biology, epidemiology and
clinical studies of patterns of inheritance of disease. The initial idea
that cancer could be a product of mutations was at first prompted
by observations of chromosomal abnormalities in tumor cells by
some of the first cell biologists (Boveri, 1914), and some of the first
work inducing cancer in experimental animals by some of the first
toxicological studies (Charles & Luce-Clausen, 1942). Charles and
Luce-Clausen developed one of the first quantitative models of
multistage theory, based on observations of skin tumors on mice
painted with benzopyrene.5 It was also becoming clear in the
1940s that shifts in the curve of incidence to earlier age of onset
were correlated with exposure to various environmental insults.
Armitage and Doll (1954) argued that a series of multiple hits could
yield patterns of cancer incidence. They recognized this possibility
after studying how patterns of incidence in lung cancer shifted to
earlier age with longer duration and more extensive use of tobacco.
They suggested that for sporadic cancers, cancer incidence increased
roughly by tn1, where t is age, and n is the number of rate-limiting
steps. Fitting the data to the curve of acceleration of cancer incidence
for a variety of different cancers, it appeared that at minimum,
n  6–7 events. This theory was later developed by Nordling4 To be sure, there are many relevant causal explanations for the age of incidence curve
cancer incidence; this may have been due to better detection, and not necessarily an incr
earlier discovery did not lead to a decrease in mortality. Models of age-specific incidence for
of nationwide incidence generated by descriptive epidemiologists, and patterns of inciden
from ‘‘analytic’’ epidemiology, in that it involves the description of patterns of inciden
associations.
5 In particular, Charles and Luce assumed that the carcinogen causes a mutation rate u, a
painting affects N cells, then N(ut)2 cells are affected, and the time between the second gene
number of tumors per mouse after the time of first treatment is N[u(ti)].
6 Tumor ‘‘suppressors’’ are often described as involved in keeping the ‘‘brakes’’ on prolif
proliferation. Of course, no single gene is responsible for cell proliferation or quiescence. M
tissue type, age, stage of development, blood supply, and methylation patterns all contrib
important role in whether a cell is likely to continue proliferating.
7 There are a variety of histories of cancer research. Soto & Sonnenschein (1999), ma
Mukherjee (2010). Cantor’s (2008) collection is a comprehensive overview of issues surrou
the politics behind the science of cancer causation. Morange (2011) in contrast, considers
science more so than the political and social context. Perhaps needless to say, there is no ‘‘n
the ‘‘winners.’’ I certainly cannot make any claims to a comprehensive history here, but I c
cancer research can be found, e.g., in Morange (2011), and a brief but accessible and eng
Research’’ (http://www.nature.com/milestones/milecancer/timeline.html).
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(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.03.019(1953) and Stocks (1953), who generated log-log plots of incidence
for different cancers, and used these data models of cancer incidence
to argue that different cancers had different numbers of steps required
for onset.
In 1971, Knudson generated a very precise, testable hypothesis:
‘‘the hypothesis is . . . that retinoblastoma is a cancer caused by two
mutational events. In the dominantly inherited form, one mutation
is inherited via the germinal cells and the second occurs in the so-
matic cells. In the nonhereditary form, both mutations occur in so-
matic cells’’ (Knudson, 1971, p. 820). Drawing upon patterns of
familial incidence of retinoblastoma (siblings with and without
the disease), and marking the patterns of age of onset of bilateral
versus unilateral cancers, Knudson developed a mathematical
model that represented cancer as a product of at least two muta-
tions to a dominantly inherited gene. Knudson’s prediction was
borne out. In fact, RB (the retinoblastoma gene) was the first and
prototypic tumor ‘‘suppressor’’ gene, a gene associated with regu-
lation of the cell cycle or apoptosis.6 Knudson developed this
hypothesis on the bases of patterns of age of onset; the patterns of
incidence constrained the available hypotheses ‘‘from the top down.’’
By comparing and contrasting children that acquired the disease ear-
lier versus later, and in two eyes versus one, he was able to hypoth-
esize that the earlier onset and more devastating cases were likely
due to the fact that these children needed to pass through fewer
steps to get cancer than sporadic cases. Not only has Knudson’s RB
gene been identified, but its mechanism of action and role in the on-
set of retinoblastoma is well understood.
The case of retinoblastoma is unique, in that it is a childhood
cancer with a strong heritable component. Most cancers take dec-
ades to develop, and thus involve the acquisition of a series of
mutations. But, understanding this case was an important frame-
work for further work. Moreover, the familial data was integrated
with subsequent work on the rates and character of retinal devel-
opment (Hethcote & Knudson, 1978), much like work on the char-
acter of tissue renewal in the colon has informed understanding of
how carcinogenesis develops in that tissue (Cairns, 1975). The mul-
tistage theory of carcinogenesis provided a ‘‘unified’’ theory, draw-
ing upon these data. More recently, detailed understanding of the
complex networks of genes that control the cell cycle, and the
reconstruction of ‘‘phylogenies’’ of cancer progression linking
stages of cancer development to particular genetic changes has
been linked with the idea that cancer involves the acquisition of
a series of mutations, epigenetic, and chromosomal changes over
time (Gerlinger, 2012). Particular mutations associated with colon
cancer progression and their mechanisms of action in the cell have
been identified (Fearon & Vogelstein, 1990), and the role of epige-
netic changes such as hyper- and hypomethylation in gene expres-
sion (Hu et al., 2005), were further integrated into the theory.7 Ins, and their changes over time. e.g., the PSA test’s popularity led to a spike in prostate
ease in (deadly) cancers, as seems clear from the fact that the spike in incidence and
different cancers are available through SEER database, a US government run catalogue
ce in different countries are compiled by IARC. Descriptive epidemiology is different
ce or mortality from different diseases, rather than attempting to discern causal
nd that t is the time since onset of the treatment, the probability of two hits is (ut)2. If
tic hit and the growth of a papilloma is i. Charles and Luce-Clauson concluded that the
eration of cells, whereas ‘‘oncogenes’’ are often described as ‘‘pressing the gas’’ on cell
any genes in combination, along with the tissue microenvironment, immune systems,
ute to whether a cell divides or dies. However, there are some genes that do play an
ke a striking contrast with Weinberg (2008) and Angier (1988), and more recently,
nding control and prevention. Proctor’s Cancer Wars (1996) is a compelling history of
the relationship between biological theory and cancer research, focusing on the basic
eutral’’ history—some will inevitably see my version as ‘‘triumphalist,’’ i.e., as favoring
an claim to draw upon a variety of sources; e.g., a balanced account of the history of
aging history can be found in Nature (multiple authors), 2006, ‘‘Milestones in Cancer
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have been brought to bear on the construction (and reconstruction)
of the family of mathematical models of carcinogenesis. Each source
both served to support the core idea behind the models, that cancer
was the product of a process extended over time, limited by the
accumulation of step-wise changes, but also often complicated the
models, incorporating new information to the larger picture of can-
cer’s dynamics.
In sum, the multi-stage dynamic model of cancer involved inte-
grating data from a variety of different sources. All of the following
played a role: cell biology (identification of chromosomal abnor-
malities in tumors, suggesting that mutations may be involved in
cancer), toxicology (tests on animal models suggesting the two-
hit theory), epidemiology (evidence that the curve of incidence
could be shifted to earlier onset in smokers, suggesting that the
rate could somehow be increased), and eventually, clinical medi-
cine and studies of hereditary incidence of cancer (yielding Knud-
son’s hypothesis) and molecular genetics (discovery of RB). Each of
these independent sources of data informed the construction of the
mathematical models of cancer’s dynamics.
3.2. Explanatory integration
The practice of modeling cancer dynamics today is the culmina-
tion of the history of a unifying explanatory theory of carcinogen-
esis: the multistage model. Unifying theories often trade scope and
explanatory power for detail. Modeling often involves idealization
and simplification; for instance, one might assume (falsely) that
the rate of some process is constant, or that a series of events oc-
curs continuously, and that each event is independent of the oth-
ers. By and large, it’s easier to build a mathematical model when
one makes such simplifying assumptions, and one often builds
upon a prototype, or a model of the same or a similar process with
similar dynamics. Modelers in the tradition of cancer dynamics de-
ploy both simplification and appropriation. For instance, some of
the first models built in the 1950s made a number of assumptions:
Mutations are the exclusive rate limiting events in cancer
progression.
Cell mutations are a Poisson process, or stochastic process
where each event is assumed to be independent of others, and
occurring in a given time interval, and a tumor might occur after
k such events (Nordling, 1953).
Cancer initiation is a chance event, takes place suddenly, and
has a specified transition probability density function, or rate of
change per unit time for each tissue type (Armitage & Doll, 1954)
Each tissue type has a specified induction period, constant for
all initiation events in that tissue, but varying between tissues
according to some distribution.
Some of the above assumptions were known or suspected to be
false; others were merely hypotheses at the time they were pro-
posed. Armitage and Doll (1954) were quite candid, for instance,
in granting that different individuals’ responses to the same envi-
ronmental insult might have different outcomes, or that the rates
of change in the same tissue type might vary by individual ex-
posed. It was gradually becoming apparent that different tissue
types, for instance, the colon crypt versus the cycles of growth
and regression in breast and endometrial tissues, involved differ-
ent rates of turnover of cells, and different rates of accumulation
of mutations. Where appropriate, modelers would cite evidence
(e.g., from cytology, genetics, incidence of leukemia in radiation ex-8 For instance, in 1999, two researchers, Soto and Sonnenschein, wrote a book-length crit
of the somatic mutation theory, or SMT. Soto and Sonnenschein argued that the SMT sh
Sonnenschein and Soto argue that the SMT inappropriately identifies the ‘‘default’’ state o
within the cell. Instead, they argue that cancer is an ‘‘emergent’’ product of failure in con
Bertolaso, 2009, 2011; Malaterre, 2007), it’s not clear that these two theories are necessar
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(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.03.019posed individuals, or the epidemiological data on smoking and
cancer incidence), to support one or another assumption in their
models. Good modelers are careful to be clear about when an
assumption used to construct a model is deliberate simplification
or simply false, and when it is a hypothesis supported by evidence.
Unfortunately, what starts as deliberate simplification may often
be confused with actual hypothesis and latter reified into theory.8
Nonetheless, these simplified models explained the age of inci-
dence curves. If cancer is a rate-limited, multi-stage process, then,
cancer incidence increases with age, and different numbers and
types of events explain why there are different curves for different
cancers. If cancer involves many steps, and these steps have a con-
stant rate, we can understand cancer as the endpoint of the gradual
accumulation of changes to cells and tissues over time, where vari-
ations between different curves and different ages of onset are
explained either by inherited mutations, environmental insults,
for different cancer types, or, different rate of turnover of cells in
different tissues and different tissue architecture. The ‘‘explana-
tion,’’ in other words, is in terms of a general pattern or type of pro-
cess, not the detailed causal mechanisms involved in setting the
pace of these dynamics, in part because there is no single causal
mechanism. To be sure, this explanation appeals only to a general
pattern or type of process (Strevens ‘‘kernel’’), not the detailed cau-
sal mechanisms involved in setting the pace of these dynamics, in
part because there is no single causal mechanism. For any specific
cancer, there must be a much more complex story. And, smoking
can ‘‘shift’’ a curve of incidence earlier. So too can familial muta-
tions, such as APC or BRCA I or II.
Thus, there is in a sense a ‘‘unified’’ theory of progression to
cancer, even though cancers in different tissues often have very
different molecular genetic profiles, as well as distinctive tissue
micro-environments and immune environments. Initially, the the-
ory black boxed this variation, as well as the detailed mechanistic
and functional changes associated with particular mutations. To-
day, not only are the specific sequences of mutations better known,
but how and why they affect cellular growth is much better
known. However, the important point to note in this case is that
the explanatory target in the case of cancer’s dynamics is not a
complete picture of oncogenesis in all its detail, but patterns of
age-specific incidence.
Frank usefully analogizes the dynamic progression of cancer
with the flight trajectory of an airplane:
Molecular technology promises to reveal the biochemical
changes of cancer. With that promise has also come and implicit
assumption: one will understand cancer by enumerating the
major biochemical changes involved in progression and the
linkages of biochemical processes into networks that control
birth and death. But enumerating parts and their connections
is not enough.
Think about a large airplane. If you were on that plane, the flight
trajectory is what you would most care about. Could you predict
the flight trajectory if you knew all of the individual control sys-
tems and their complex feedbacks? Probably not, because an
inventory by itself does not provide all of the rates at which
changes occur. Even with all of the rates for component pro-
cesses, it would not be easy to work out the trajectory.
One needs to link the parts to the outcome: how do particular
changes in components shift the plane’s trajectory? One ulti-
mately assigns causality to parts by how changes in the parts
affect changes in the outcome.ique and history of what they took to be misleading assumptions and misconceptions
ould be replaced by TOFT, or ‘‘tissue organization field theory’’ (1999, 2000, 2005).
f cells as quiescence rather than proliferation, and locates the causal origin of cancer
trols on cellular growth by the surrounding tissue. As others have argued (see, e.g.,
ily in competition.
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must understand the forces that shape the age-incidence curve
and the forces that shift the curve. . .
Perhaps we should wait for all the molecular and cellular
details, after which the nature of progression and the final out-
come of incidence may be clear. Unfortunately, enumeration
will not work. The full list of parts for our plane does not tell
us how it flies . . . (Frank, 2007, pp. 309–311)
Frank’s analogy is instructive; the point here is very simple. Molec-
ular geneticists have devoted much (worthwhile) effort to under-
standing the basic biology underpinning progression. However, in
attempting to understand cancer, we should be concerned with
more than simply enumerating all the molecular, genetic, cell, and
tissue changes involved. Understanding cancer involves also under-
standing general patterns, e.g., of incidence over time, and in inher-
ited versus sporadic cases. Such understanding requires a general
modeling strategy, which (ultimately) will be integrated with the
biochemical processes controlling cell and tissue growth. Indeed,
arguably, without the multistage model, there would not have been
the theoretical framework in place to go out and seek particular
genes involved in cancer.
Of course, in any general mathematical or computational model
of a complex biological process, at least initially, one needs to black
box some elements of the component causal process, and this is no
less true in the case of modeling cancer’s dynamics. Today, how-
ever, a variety of data constrains construction of models both from
the ‘‘top down’’ (age of incidence data serves to delimit the number
of discrete changes yielding cancer, e.g., mutation, epigenetic
events), and, from the ‘‘bottom up’’ (e.g., with improved under-
standing of genetics, epigenetics, cellular and molecular bases of
cancer).
What all the models of cancer dynamics share is that there is a
cascade of rate-limited events that eventuate in tumor formation;
but different cancers will exhibit different series of events yielding
cancer. For instance, anti-apoptosis mutations can lead to chromo-
somal instability, followed by loss of heterozygosity; mutations in
genes controlling cell cycle and mismatch repair are affected, as
are epigenetic changes inmethylation or chromatin structure, inter-
cellular signaling, and the extracellular matrix. But this is just one
possible sequence of events; each cancer is likely different, though
there are some robust or common sequential patterns and processes
(e.g., see, Spencer, 2006). In otherwords, constraint on allowable dy-
namic models of cancer is also ‘‘bottom up.’’ This analysis of model-
ing of cancer’s dynamics is compatible with Craver’s (2007) mosaic,
inter-level integration, and also, with Bechtel’s (2010) account of
combining intra-level causal relations and inter-level causal rela-
tions, or ‘‘top down’’ and ‘‘bottom up’’ explanations.
Cancer is a heterogeneous, and complex phenomena; while the
multistage theory may account for or explain curves of cancer inci-
dence for many cancers, it may not capture the complex causal
dynamics underpinning each and every cancer (Weinberg, 2008).
But, this is not altogether surprising. As modelers are well aware,
if we waited upon (much less attempted to include) complete
information, we would never build a model. Second, and perhaps
more subtly, modeling is an exercise in simplification, in service
of getting a (however preliminary) explanatory framework for
some phenomenon. If we see all cancers as having in common a
similar ‘‘dynamics,’’ we have a tool for approaching new cancers
and new questions about these cancers by drawing upon familiar
models or representations. However imperfect these models, they
serve a pragmatic, or heuristic function—namely, to permit us to
identify relevant similarities and differences between different
cancers, or, we can see how they depart or conform to this general
characterization. Moreover, Knudson’s model (1971) made a very
specific prediction, which was not only borne out, but also led toPlease cite this article in press as: Plutynski, A. Cancer and the goals of integra
(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.03.019one of the most well-understood genetic and developmental
changes underpinning cancer.4. Conclusions
It is by now a truism that at least one of the aims of science, if
not the central aim, is to understand the causal structure of the
world (Salmon, 1989). In medicine, the aim is also (if not primarily)
to change the world—to prevent and cure disease. To change the
world, we must know how to intervene on the world. One may
intervene effectively with less than complete causal understand-
ing. Many medical interventions were known to be effective with-
out any clear (and sometimes false) understanding of why or how
they were effective. One can understand that some drug is effective
without understanding why. Moreover, one might have a partial
understanding of why a drug is effective; one can know that a drug
somehow intervenes on a certain metabolic, cellular, or gene regu-
latory pathway, but now exactly how it intervenes (which gene, en-
zyme, cytokine, etc. it intervenes upon).
Scientists give partial, incomplete, and how possibly explana-
tions. The adequacy of an explanation (at least in practice) is often
contingent upon its purposes. Clinicians and researchers may have
different purposes, targets, and so different methodologies and
standards of explanatory adequacy. As different disciplines focus
attention on different explananda, so their standards of explana-
tory success will differ, and depend importantly on the relevant
contrasts to the fact to be explained (Broadbent, 2011). In much
of the philosophical literature on explanation, these hard won
observations about scientific practice are often off screen. Scientific
theories or explanations are measured against some ideal of com-
pleteness, whether this is an ideal explanatory text, or the world
itself. In advancing a normative philosophy of science (e.g., one
that advocates for more integrative research, or, alternatively, for
‘‘unified’’ theories), one must ask what function such norms serve:
e.g., what is the benefit of integrative research?Why, if at all, ought
‘‘unifying’’ theories to be preferred?
Philosophers of science tried to discover or characterize the
‘‘logical structure’’ of scientific theories, or provide a unified ac-
count of shared goals among the sciences, when no such account
could be had. A consensus seems to be building that the practice
of science might better be characterized as a patchwork of more
or less ‘‘integrated’’ activities. Unifying theories may play a preli-
minary role in framing a research program; integration is a distinc-
tive goal, but the two are not necessarily at odds. A unified or
unifying theory may start as a simplified, idealized starting point,
a model that, over time, might accommodate a wider array of cau-
sal factors, or complex interactive effects. That is, incorporating a
more integrative perspective, either via integration of data, con-
cepts, methods, or instruments in service of solving specific prob-
lems or addressing particular anomalies, is not necessarily at odds
with adopting models that treat distinctive phenomena as of a
kind, or due to common causal patterns or processes.
Integration has become a term with a great deal of normative
weight; calls for more integrative science seems to suppose that
more ‘‘integrative’’ science will, perhaps, consider a wider array
of evidence, provide a more holistic and complete picture of the
world, and to top it all off, cure cancer. While it would be nice if
a single, well-defined strategy could do all this, when one attends
to the practice of science, what one is more likely to discover are a
variety of partial, incomplete, and idealized models, explanations
and hypotheses, targeted at different goals, which turn out to have
greater or lesser scope, and which are more or less ‘‘integrative.’’
Indeed, dividing the subject matter and focusing on one very spe-
cific phenomenon (e.g., age of incidence curves) can yield many
useful insights. In other words, a ‘‘divide and conquer’’ approach,tion. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
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strategy, provided that the divisions are not arbitrary, but informed
by sound empirical evidence, and provided that models deployed
are later understood to be just that: hypothetical, idealized, or sim-
plified, not ‘‘true’’ models of the world in all its complexity. Inte-
gration may be a local goal, appropriate to some contexts and
not others. Woodward (2010) argues that explanations in biology
should be ‘‘proportional,’’ or that, depending upon the explananda,
or, facts to be explained, the appropriate level of analysis may re-
quire ‘‘black boxing’’ detailed component causes.
Early models of cancer’s dynamics did just this; they ‘‘black
boxed’’ both exogenous causes and component mechanisms
underlying cancer initiation and progression. Later models filled
in these boxes, with more detail about the molecular and genetic
changes underpinning specific cancers. The object of explanation
in cancer dynamics is patterns of cancer incidence at the popula-
tion level. The ‘‘explanatory’’ integration in cancer dynamics con-
sists thus in showing how different patterns of cancer incidence
are similarly caused by a multistage processes.
Some might claim that scientists who black box or leave off
screen all the complex causal interactions involved in producing
some phenomena are not engaged in genuine ‘‘integration.’’ How-
ever, attention to the practice of science suggests that integration
can be partial, incomplete, or come in degrees. In other words,
explanatory integration is not singular in type, or in quality. One
can integrate data, methods, and explanations, to a greater or les-
ser degree, and the process of integration is often an iterated one,
requiring that we circle back and reconfigure our understanding of
both the object of explanation and the explanation itself. Paradigm
change of the sort that involves a wholesale rejection of one ‘‘the-
ory’’ in favor of another is rare; what is more common is that two
research programs or subdisciplines discover mutual interest in a
common problem or family of problems, which they may jointly
solve. In understanding carcinogenesis, rather than the paradigm
change from gene-centric vision that Soto and Sonnenschein
(1999) hoped for, there may instead be a gradual accommodation
and integration of the more diverse perspectives underway (see,
e.g., Malaterre, 2007).
There are two sides to the ‘‘integration’’ story. Some see in
integration the ideal of a complete and comprehensive explana-
tion. However, we should beware of freighting integration with
the weight of explanatory ‘‘completeness.’’ Woodward’s account
of how choice of levels of explanation is determined is a useful
reminder that scientific practice is often a matter of choosing
one’s battles carefully. Similarly, Wimsatt (1976, 2006) argues
in his account of heuristics of modeling that reductionistic re-
search strategies (while they have their limits) can be very effec-
tive at solving specific problems, as well as testing the limits of a
reductive or simplified model. Modeling cancer dynamics is an
example; by initially developing and testing simple models one
can see patterns, which lead to successful predictions, as well
as exceptions, and new models and explanations. One’s choice
of the object of explanation may involve simplifying or idealizing
the component causal process, and focusing on one feature of the
process of cancer progression to the exclusion of others. This
anchoring process inevitably leaves some (lower level) mechanis-
tic details outside of the explanation. However, such a strategy
has arguably proven one of the more fruitful ones in science; par-
ticularly in sciences that are concerned to understand complex
causal processes like cancer, choosing one’s battles may be the
only way.9 Some biologists prefer to use the term ‘‘epigenetic’’ to refer all and only to heritable
(Ptashne, 2007); here I use the term in the broader sense of non-genetic changes that are
explanation and examples of this use elsewhere).
Please cite this article in press as: Plutynski, A. Cancer and the goals of integra
(2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.03.019Theories evolve. Today, as researchers in this field are well
aware, many factors affect carcinogenesis; it is an enormously
complex process, involving not only changes to genes, but also
cell-to-cell signaling, changes in the functioning of gene networks,
epigenetic9 changes (hyper- and hypo-methylation), changes in the
intercellular micro-environment, changes in tissue architecture,
changes in interactions with the immune system, and much more
besides. Some of these features can and have been integrated into
the multi-stage model, but by no means all. All mathematical models
involve by necessity idealization; no single mathematical model
could represent all the ‘‘causes’’ of cancer at every relevant temporal
and spatial scale. It is exactly for this reason that biologists focus on
one scale of analysis, and develop simple, idealized models. Such ide-
alizations are enormously effective in predicting, e.g., patterns of
incidence, or, in discovering potential modes of intervention. The
multi-stage model is ‘‘integrative,’’ but it is also an attempt at unified
account of what is ultimately a heterogeneous and enormously com-
plex process.
Integration as a goal is often contrasted with the goals achieved
by simplification and idealization often associated with unifica-
tion; of course, the two goals are often in tension. As Cartwright
(1980) has argued, comprehensive theories may sacrifice explana-
tory power and scope for causal detail. However, simple theories
with the goal of unifying a diverse array of types of phenomena
may also be the starting point for more integrative work, both
via challenges to the theory, and, with integration of insights from
diverse fields. It may turn out that the multistage model of cancer
dynamics captures the underlying process of carcinogenesis only
90% or 70% or perhaps only 50% of cancers. In part for this reason,
explanatory integration will often (and perhaps inevitably) be an
iterated process, yielding partial, context-specific and hard-won
explanations, which may either over time either become more
integrative, by drawing upon a wider array of data from different
sources, or, conversely, may be found to fail at identifying the most
salient causal processes, or explaining as wide a scope of phenom-
ena as might have been hoped.
As with any mathematical model of a complex system, in mod-
eling cancer’s dynamics, one runs aground of the problem of trad-
ing off generality with precision and descriptive adequacy. As in so
much of biology, in cancer research, there are few if any general
laws (Kincaid, 2008). Instead, one finds families of models, hypoth-
eses, and generalizations of varying scope. In describing and
explaining general patterns and processes, biologists often gener-
ate families of models (Downes, 1992; Lloyd, 1984), and such mod-
els are often simplified and idealized representations of the
systems of interest. Perhaps especially in mathematical biology,
there is often a trade-off between generality and realism (Levins,
1966; Weisberg, 2006, 2013). This is no less so in the case of mod-
eling carcinogenesis.
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